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Based on a review of several “anomalies” in research using implicit measures, Machery (2021) dismisses the modal 
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that the modal view is empirically unsupported, we argue that implicit measures can make a valuable contribution to 
understanding the complexities of human behavior if they are used wisely in a way that acknowledges what they can and 
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In response to our descriptive review of ongoing 
debates about what implicit measures measure 
(Brownstein, Madva, & Gawronski, 2019), Machery 
(2021) discusses several important findings in research 
using implicit measures that he describes as 
“anomalies.” Based on the identified anomalies, 
Machery dismisses both the modal paradigm in 
research using implicit measures and, by extension, the 
value of implicit measures. Here, we respond to 
Machery’s critique, arguing that the findings reviewed 
by Machery are anomalies only for specific—
influential but long-contested—accounts that treat 
responses on implicit measures as uncontaminated 
indicators of trait-like unconscious representations that 
coexist with functionally independent conscious 
representations. However, the reviewed findings are to-
be-expected “normalities” when viewed from the 
perspective of long-standing alternative frameworks 
that treat responses on implicit measures as the product 
of dynamic processes that operate on momentarily 
activated, consciously accessible information. Thus, 
although we agree with Machery that the modal view is 
theoretically, empirically, and methodologically 
unsubstantiated, its inconsistency with the available 
evidence does not imply that implicit measures are 
useless for understanding the underpinnings of human 
behavior.  
We focus on this central disagreement in our reply. 
Before explaining our position, however, we briefly 
note a few important issues which we will set aside for 
now. We agree with Machery that models of the 
cumulative effects of social biases require empirical 
support (Mallon, 2021) and that the effectiveness of 
implicit-bias training requires scientific scrutiny 
(Brownstein, Madva, & Gawronski, 2020; Madva, 
2020). We also agree that poor science communication 
is a fundamental problem in this area, although it is 
crucial to clearly distinguish between problems in 
scientific research and problems in the public 
communication of scientific research. While extremely 
important, we also set aside debates about the use of 
implicit measures to investigate macro-level 
phenomena (e.g., the bias of states and nations; see 
Payne, Vuletich, & Lundberg, 2017). Finally, we note 
that Machery’s repeated invocation of how much 
remains unsettled “30 years after the implicit 
revolution” (p. 5) takes it as self-evident that 30 years 
is too long for a scientific research program to settle on 
the kinds of debates and frameworks we discuss here. 
This is not at all self-evident. Basic theorizing about 
emotion, perception, attention, and consciousness is 
multipronged, conflicted, and ongoing—appropriately 
so—after much more than 30 years.   
In explaining our view on the anomalies identified 
by Machery, we adopt the same meta-theoretical stance 
that we used in our review, treating responses on 
implicit measures as behaviors rather than direct 
indicators of mental constructs (see De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). More 
specifically, we understand them as responses to stimuli 
under suboptimal processing conditions, elicited 
without intention and with little cognitive elaboration 
(see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 
2009). As such, they can be distinguished from 
responses on explicit measures, which tend to be shaped 
by intentions and greater cognitive elaboration. This 
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theoretically agnostic conceptualization raises two 
important questions: (1) what underlies responses on 
implicit measures and (2) in which sense are their 
underpinnings similar or different from those of 
responses on explicit measures? 
Underlying Representations 
From the perspective of our behavioral 
conceptualization, two important arguments in 
Machery’s critique are that (1) the mental 
representations underlying responses on implicit 
measures are not unconscious and (2) there is no 
evidence for the idea that responses on implicit and 
explicit measures are driven by two distinct underlying 
representations (e.g., implicit vs. explicit attitudes). We 
fully agree with these conclusions, which are perfectly 
consistent with well-established theories in this area 
(e.g., Fazio, 2007, Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These theories assume that 
the same associative representations underlie responses 
on both implicit and explicit measures and that these 
representations are consciously accessible. Whether the 
assumption of associative representation is defensible 
in light of recent evidence is a different question, 
because a growing body of evidence suggests that the 
representations underlying responses on implicit and 
explicit measures have propositional structure (for 
reviews, see Corneille & Stahl, 2019; De Houwer, Van 
Dessel, & Moran, 2020; Kurdi & Dunham, 2020). 
Although research on this question is ongoing, the 
critical point is that evidence against unconsciousness 
and dual representations are anomalies only for 
frameworks that postulate two distinct underlying 
representations, one being conscious and one being 
unconscious. However, these assumptions are rejected 
by alternative frameworks that have shaped the field for 
a long time.  
Reliability 
Although we share Machery’s general concern 
about the reliability of implicit measures, his analysis 
misses important nuances, especially the difference 
between internal consistency and test-retest stability. 
While the internal consistency of a measure sets an 
upper limit for the proportion of systematic construct 
variance, the test-retest stability of a measure specifies 
the proportion of systematic variance that is stable over 
time. Machery questions the construct validity of 
implicit measures based on evidence for low test-retest 
stability, which conflates internal consistency and test-
retest stability. A more nuanced analysis suggests that 
the internal consistency of some implicit measures 
(e.g., implicit association test; affect misattribution 
procedure) is quite high, meeting the psychometric 
standards applied to explicit measures (Gawronski & 
De Houwer, 2014). For other implicit measures, 
internal consistency is only moderate (e.g., go/no-go 
association task) or unsatisfactory (e.g., evaluative 
priming task). These differences are important, because 
the internal consistency of a given measure sets an 
upper limit for its correlations with other measures, 
including correlations with itself at a different time. 
Mathematically, a measure with low internal 
consistency cannot show high temporal stability, 
because low internal consistency implies a low signal-
to-noise ratio in measurement scores (unless random 
error is controlled in latent-variable analyses). Yet, high 
internal consistency does not imply high temporal 
stability, which is reflected in the finding that implicit 
measures with high internal consistency nevertheless 
show only moderate-to-low temporal stability 
(Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017).  
Does this mean that these measures have low 
construct validity? If the measure is supposed to capture 
a temporally stable, trait-like construct, the answer 
would be yes. However, such a conclusion would be ill-
founded for measures of state-like constructs that are 
known to be highly context-sensitive. Indeed, responses 
on implicit measures have long been known to be 
highly context-sensitive (Blair, 2002; Gawronski & 
Sritharan, 2010) and research using latent-state-trait 
modeling suggests that the total amount of systematic 
construct variance on implicit measures comprises a 
mix of situation-related and person-related variance 
(e.g., Dentale, Veccione, Ghezzi, & Barbaranelli, 2019; 
Koch, Ortner, Eid, Caspers, & Schmitt, 2014; Lemmer, 
Gollwitzer, & Banse, 2015; Schmukle & Egloff, 2005). 
Although these findings conflict with the idea that 
responses on implicit measures exclusively reflect trait-
like constructs that are highly stable over time, they are 
consistent with theories that treat responses on implicit 
measures as the product of dynamic processes that 
operate on momentarily accessible information (e.g., 
Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Schwarz, 2007). Because incidental changes in 
contexts over time are unlikely to be identical for 
different participants, temporal stability should be low 
according to these theories. This does not mean that the 
measures have low construct validity, but that the 
measured states have changed in different ways for 
different participants in the sample. By conflating 
internal consistency and test-retest stability, Machery’s 
analysis misses this important nuance. 
Behavior Prediction  
Because the states underlying responses on implicit 
measures fluctuate over time, implicit measures should 
perform poorly in predicting other behavioral criteria 
when there is a delay between the completion of the 
implicit measure and the measurement of the to-be-
predicted behavior (see Gawronski, 2019). From this 
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perspective, the relatively weak relations between 
implicit measures and behavioral criteria obtained in 
meta-analyses (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 
2012; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 
2009; Kurdi et al., 2019; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, 
Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013) are not surprising, especially 
for cases where there is a delay between the implicit 
measure and the measurement of the behavioral 
criterion. This is not a post-hoc rationalization of 
inconvenient findings, but a straightforward prediction 
of theories that treat responses on implicit measures as 
the product of dynamic processes that operate on 
momentarily accessible information. Poor predictive 
validity over time is certainly disappointing for 
everyone who was hoping to improve the prediction of 
future behavior by using implicit measures, but it 
constitutes an anomaly only for theories claiming that 
implicit measures capture temporally stable traits.  
A different question concerns the prediction of 
behavior without delays within the same context. One 
does not have to be a proponent of dual-process theories 
to agree with the methodological dictum that relations 
between a predictor measure and a behavioral-criterion 
measure should increase as a function of increasing 
convergence of the mechanisms underlying responses 
on the two measures and the processing conditions 
during measurement (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 
2014). Thus, even from a theoretically agnostic view, 
implicit measures should be superior in predicting 
unintentional behavior resulting from low elaboration, 
while explicit measures should be superior in predicting 
intentional behavior resulting from high elaboration. 
Machery notes that this hypothesis received little 
support in meta-analyses on the predictive validity of 
implicit measures. 
It is correct that little evidence supports the 
predicted dissociation pattern in analyses based on post-
hoc categorizations of behavioral criteria in terms of 
processing features, comparing predictive relations 
between studies. However, there is substantial evidence 
for the predicted dissociation pattern in analyses based 
on original categorizations of behavioral criteria in a 
given study, comparing predictive relations within 
studies (Cameron et al., 2012). Machery dismisses the 
latter findings, because the studies were not 
preregistered. However, the same is true for the 
overwhelming majority of studies cited by Machery in 
support of his arguments. It is unconvincing to 
selectively invoke concerns about lack of 
preregistration only for findings inconsistent with a 
preferred narrative.  
Furthermore, while explicit measures have shown 
relatively strong relations with deliberate behavior and 
relatively weak relations with spontaneous behavior in 
meta-analytic comparisons between studies, implicit 
measures have shown small positive relations with both 
spontaneous and deliberate behavior. To the extent the 
dissociation hypothesis is correct, this asymmetric 
pattern can result from simple differences in the 
reliability of behavioral-criterion measures, given that 
measures of spontaneous behavior are often based on a 
single observation whereas measures of deliberate 
behavior tend to aggregate multiple observations, 
thereby controlling for measurement error. As 
explained by Gawronski (2019, p. 582):  
For explicit measures, the described asymmetry in 
the reliability of behavioral criteria should 
produce strong relations to deliberate behavior 
(because of matching processing conditions with a 
reliable behavioral criterion) and relatively weak 
or nonsignificant relations to spontaneous 
behavior (because of mismatching processing 
conditions with an unreliable behavioral 
criterion). In contrast, for implicit measures, the 
described asymmetry in the reliability of the 
behavioral criteria should produce relatively weak 
relations to both spontaneous behavior (because of 
low reliability of the behavioral measure) and 
deliberate behavior (because of mismatching 
processing conditions). 
Because differences in the reliability of behavioral 
criteria are more likely to be controlled in studies 
designed to test the hypothesized dissociation, these 
considerations explain why the full dissociation pattern 
emerged only in meta-analytic comparisons of 
behavioral criteria within studies, but not in meta-
analytic comparisons of behavioral criteria between 
studies (Cameron et al., 2012). This conclusion is also 
consistent with a large body of research showing the 
hypothesized dissociation pattern for predictions of the 
same behavior under different processing conditions 
(e.g., prediction of a given behavior under conditions of 
high vs. low cognitive load; prediction of a given 
behavior for people with intuitive vs. deliberative 
thinking styles; for a review, see Friese, Hofmann, & 
Schmitt, 2008). The latter findings cannot be dismissed 
as the product of arbitrary post-hoc classifications of the 
behavioral criteria, because the to-be-predicted 
behavioral criterion is the same and there is no 
ambiguity about the classifications of the theoretically 
relevant moderators (e.g., high vs. low cognitive load; 
intuitive vs. deliberative thinking style). Thus, although 
meta-analytic findings regarding the predicted 
dissociation pattern are mixed, a more nuanced analysis 
provides a simple explanation for why the predicted 
pattern is more likely to emerge in meta-analytic 
comparisons within studies than comparisons between 
studies. 
Causality 
A final “anomaly” identified by Machery is that 
experimentally induced changes on implicit measures 
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do not seem to mediate corresponding changes in 
behavior (Forscher et al., 2019). According to Machery, 
this meta-analytic finding poses a major challenge to 
the idea that whatever is being measured by implicit 
measures is causally effective in influencing 
downstream behavior. We agree that this finding might 
seem puzzling, but the expectation of mediation in such 
cases is based on two questionable premises.  
First, it is worth noting that there are no process-
pure psychological measures that exclusively reflect a 
single construct. In research using implicit measures, 
acknowledgement of this issue has inspired the use of 
formal modeling approaches to quantify the 
contributions of multiple distinct processes to responses 
on implicit measures (for reviews, see Calanchini, 
2020; Sherman, Klauer, & Allen, 2010). Moreover, to 
the extent that all implicit measures have more than one 
source of systematic variance, observed changes on 
implicit measures should generalize to behavioral-
criterion measures only if the affected source of 
variance is also relevant for the behavioral criterion 
(e.g., when high cognitive load affects both 
performance on the implicit measure and the behavioral 
criterion). To the extent that responses on the implicit 
measure are affected via a source of variance that is 
irrelevant for the behavioral criterion, changes on the 
implicit measure should not be associated with 
corresponding changes on the behavioral-criterion 
measure. Such findings are surprising only when 
implicit measures are treated as golden pipelines into a 
single underlying construct, but not when their lack of 
process-purity is taken into account.  
Second, the expectation of a mediating link 
between changes on implicit measures and changes in 
behavioral-criterion measures is based on a flawed 
conceptualization of mediation that has been criticized 
for a long time (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; De 
Houwer et al., 2013; Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011; 
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). For the current 
analysis, the most significant issue is that responses on 
implicit measures are behaviors, and these behaviors 
should not be equated with their underlying mental 
constructs (see De Houwer et al., 2013; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015). In 
this sense, their ontological status is not different from 
the one of to-be-predicted behaviors. They are just two 
kinds of behaviors. Although it makes sense to assume 
that change in a shared underlying mental construct 
should lead to corresponding changes in both, it makes 
less sense to assume that changes in one type of 
behavior is, just as such, causally effective in producing 
change in a different type of behavior. If the two are 
treated as two kinds of behaviors, the situation is 
actually more similar to a common-third-variable 
scenario, where correlations between two behavioral 
measures are driven by their shared relation to a 
common causal factor that influences both measures. In 
this case, changes in the underlying causal force can be 
expected to produce changes in two behavioral 
measures that are influenced by that factor. However, it 
would be absurd to treat one of the two behavioral 
variables as a mediator of changes in the other. These 
limitations and various other problems of mediation 
analyses have been discussed extensively in the past 15 
years, and they have led some journal editors in 
psychology to explicitly discourage the use of 
mediation analyses. Yet, despite the insights gained in 
these debates, the finding that changes in implicit 
measures do not mediate changes in behavioral-
criterion measures has been mistakenly interpreted as 
an “anomaly” that would question the validity of 
implicit measures. As with the other findings reviewed 
by Machery, this so-called “anomaly” turns into a to-
be-expected “normality” when the current state of the 
field is taken into account. 
Individual Differences 
An important question in response to our analysis 
is whether a dynamic-process view on implicit 
measures involves a notion of radical situationism that 
puts it at odds with the strong emphasis on individual 
differences in the modal view. Although dynamic 
theories tend to focus more heavily on the impact of 
situation-related compared to person-related factors, 
they are consistent with influences of both factors, 
because momentary activation of information in 
memory is a joint product of both (Cunningham et al., 
2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The same 
stimulus can activate different thoughts in a given 
person when the stimulus is encountered in different 
contexts, suggesting a major role of situation-related 
factors. Meanwhile, when a given stimulus is 
encountered within the same context, the stimulus can 
activate different thoughts in different people, 
suggesting a major role of person-related factors. In 
fact, the available evidence suggests that responses on 
implicit measures are best understood as an interactive 
product of the two, in that (1) people show systematic 
differences in their responses to a particular stimulus 
within a given situation, but (2) individual differences 
within a given situation may not generalize across 
situations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2017). 
Consistent with this idea, the relatively low test-retest 
stability of implicit measures has been found to increase 
to a level that is consistent with the notion of temporally 
stable traits when the measure included context-stimuli 
that were meaningfully related to the target stimuli 
(Gschwendner, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008; for related 
findings, see Cooley & Payne, 2017). Counter to 
Machery’s dismissal of implicit measures as tools to 
capture individual differences, these findings suggest 
that implicit measures capture meaningful differences 
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between individuals within a given context, and that 
individual differences measured within a given context 
are stable over time. If responses on implicit measure 
were an exclusive product of person-related factors 
without any impact of situation-related factors (as 
suggested by the modal view), their temporal ability 
should be high regardless of the context. Conversely, if 
responses on implicit measures were the exclusive 
product of situation-related factors without any impact 
of person-related factors (as suggested by a radical 
situationist view), differences between individuals 
within the same context should be nothing more than 
measurement noise, which should reduce test-retest 
correlations when the context is held constant across 
measurement times. Counter to the two views, implicit 
measures show greater temporal stability when the 
context is the same for everyone in the sample and the 
context is held constant over time, highlighting the 
significance of person-by-situation interactions.  
Conclusion 
The claims made here are not post-hoc attempts to 
explain away “anomalies,” but essential components of 
well-established frameworks that have shaped the 
science of implicit measures for nearly two decades. 
Dismissing implicit measures because they do not 
provide process-pure indicators of temporally stable, 
trait-like unconscious representations is like throwing 
out all the screw drivers in one’s tool box because they 
are not suitable for getting a nail into the wall. 
Understanding the complexities of human behavior 
requires multiple tools, and implicit measures can make 
a valuable contribution to this endeavor if they are used 
wisely in a way that acknowledges what they can and 
cannot do. 
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